The Role of Debt and Equity Finance over the Business Cycle by Francisco Covas & Wouter J. den Haan
Bank of Canada Banque du Canada
Working Paper 2006-45 / Document de travail 2006-45
The Role of Debt and Equity Finance over
the Business Cycle
by
Francisco Covas and Wouter J. den HaanISSN 1192-5434
Printed in Canada on recycled paperBank of Canada Working Paper 2006-45
December 2006
The Role of Debt and Equity Finance over
the Business Cycle
by
Francisco Covas1 and Wouter J. den Haan2
1Monetary and Financial Analysis Department
Bank of Canada




Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands
wdenhaan@uva.nl
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors.
No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada.iii
Contents
Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Abstract/Résumé. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Cyclical Properties of Financing Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Data set and methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Empirical results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Static Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1 Debt contract. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 Equity contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4. Dynamic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1 Prototype dynamic model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2 Benchmark model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3 Results for the prototype model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.4 Calibration of the benchmark model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.5 Results for the benchmark model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.6 Alternative parameter values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Figures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Appendix B: Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Appendix C: Robustness and Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58iv
Acknowledgements
We thank Walter Engert, Antonio Falato, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, André Kurmann, Ellen McGrattan,
Césaire Meh, Miroslav Misina, Miguel Molico, and Vincenzo Quadrini. David Chen provided
excellent research assistance.v
Abstract
The authors show that debt and equity issuance are procyclical for most listed U.S. ﬁrms. The
procyclicality of equity issuance decreases monotonically with ﬁrm size. At the aggregate level,
however, the authors’ results are not conclusive: issuance is countercyclical for very large ﬁrms
that, although few in number, have a large effect on the aggregate because of their enormous size.
If ﬁrms use the standard one-period contract, then the shadow price of external funds is
procyclical and the cyclicality decreases with ﬁrm size. This property generates equity to be
procyclical and—as in the data—the procyclicality decreases with ﬁrm size. Other factors that
cause equity to be procyclical in the model are a countercyclical price of risk and a
countercyclical cost of equity issuance. The model (i) generates a countercyclical default rate,
(ii) magniﬁes shocks, and (iii) generates a stronger cyclical response for small ﬁrms, whereas the
model without equity does the exact opposite.
JEL classiﬁcation: E3, G1, G3
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial stability; Business ﬂuctuations and cycles
Résumé
Les auteurs montrent que les activités d’emprunt et d’émission d’actions de la plupart des
entreprises américaines cotées sont procycliques, tout en notant que le caractère procyclique de
l’émission d’actions s’atténue de façon monotone avec la taille de la ﬁrme. À l’échelle de
l’ensemble des entreprises, toutefois, les résultats des auteurs ne sont pas concluants : même s’il y
a peu de très grandes entreprises, le comportement anticyclique de l’émission d’actions dans leur
cas pèse lourd au ﬁnal en raison de leur énorme taille. Si les ﬁrmes ont recours à un emprunt
classique d’une période, le prix implicite du ﬁnancement externe évolue dans le même sens que
l’activité économique et son caractère procyclique varie en raison inverse de la taille de
l’entreprise. Cette propriété confère à l’émission d’actions un caractère procyclique, qui décroît,
tout comme dans les données, avec la taille de la ﬁrme. Les autres facteurs à l’origine du
comportement procyclique de l’émission d’actions dans le modèle sont le prix du risque
(anticyclique) et le coût d’émission d’actions (anticyclique également). Le modèle i) génère un
taux de défaillance anticyclique; ii) ampliﬁe les chocs; et iii) engendre une réaction cyclique plus
forte parmi les petites entreprises, alors que le modèle sans émission d’actions produit exactement
les résultats contraires.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E3, G1, G3
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Stabilité ﬁnancière; Cycles et ﬂuctuations économiques1. Introduction
The empirical objective of this paper is to document the cyclical behaviour of ﬁrms’ external
and internal ﬁnancing sources. In recent papers, Fama and French (2005) and Frank and
Goyal (2005) document that ﬁrms frequently issue equity. It is therefore important to include
equity in such a study. A few papers have studied the cyclical behaviour of aggregate debt
and equity ﬁnance, but their conclusions diﬀer.1 In this paper, we use disaggregated data and
obtain not only a robust set of results, but also an explanation for the ambiguous ﬁndings
with aggregate data. Our results can be summarized as follows2:
• Debt and equity issuance are procyclical for the majority of publicly listed ﬁrms in our
sample.
• The procyclicality of equity issuance decreases with ﬁrm size.
• Debt and equity issuance are countercyclical for the top 1 per cent of ﬁrms. The
opposite behaviour for the very largest ﬁrms can explain the ambiguous results for
aggregate data, because quantitatively these ﬁrms are very important.3
Existing business cycle models typically assume that net worth can increase only through
retained earnings and that external ﬁnance occurs through one-period debt contracts.4 We
build a model in which ﬁrms can obtain external ﬁnance through one-period debt contracts as
well as equity. The debt contract speciﬁes a ﬁxed interest payment, which is a tax-deductible
expense. If the ﬁrm does not make that payment, then the lender gets the remaining resources
in the ﬁrm minus the bankruptcy costs. We think of default as a distress state in which the
reduction in ﬁrm value because of bankruptcy costs cannot be avoided through, for example,
renegotiation of the contract. These bankruptcy costs imply that the interest rate paid on
debt has a premium, which depends on ﬁrm characteristics. External ﬁnance through the
equity contract avoids the bankruptcy premium, but raising equity entails equity issuance
costs.
1Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) and Korajczyk and Levy (2003) ﬁnd that equity issuance is procyclical,
whereas Jermann and Quadrini (2006) ﬁnd that equity issuance (minus dividend payments) is countercyclical.
Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) ﬁnd debt issuance to be countercyclical, whereas Jermann and Quadrini
(2006) ﬁnd it to be procyclical. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) ﬁnd book value leverage to be countercyclical.
A more extensive discussion is given in Appendix C.
2In Covas and den Haan (2006), we show that the results are very similar when Canadian data are used.
3The top 1 per cent of ﬁrms cover 18 per cent of gross stock sales, 28 per cent of sales, and 34 per cent of
assets in the Compustat data set.
4See, for example, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
1The possible ﬁnancing sources resemble the two main forms of observed external ﬁnance.
Our model does not explain why diﬀerent types of contracts have come into existence. The
literature on optimal contracts does exactly this, but it is not well suited to generate predic-
tions about the cyclical behaviour of debt and equity issuance. Biais et al. (2006) derive an
optimal contract and show how to implement it with a combination of cash reserves, debt,
and equity.5 The decomposition, however, is not unique and the optimal contract can there-
fore be implemented with diﬀerent combinations of cash reserves, debt, and equity. Since
our main purpose is to understand the role of debt and equity for business ﬂuctuations, we
impose that ﬁrms use these two types of contracts.
Besides having debt as well as equity, the models considered have the following character-
istics. Firms are ex ante identical, but face a diﬀerent sequence of idiosyncratic shocks. Firms
that default are replaced by new ﬁrms with zero assets. Thus, young ﬁrms are typically also
ﬁrms with fewer assets. Firm behaviour is size dependent, because we relax the standard as-
sumption of linear technology. We also avoid the common but unappealing assumption that
frictions in obtaining ﬁrm ﬁnance are present only in the sector that produces investment
commodities.
Our starting point is a model in which the one-period debt contract is the only form of
external ﬁnance. In this framework, shocks are dampened and the default rate is procyclical.
That is, the increase in aggregate productivity induces ﬁrms to expand at the cost of a higher
default rate. We show that, with diminishing returns in the production function, the increase
in net worth that follows the increase in aggregate productivity has a dampening eﬀect on
this increase in the default rate, but quantitatively this eﬀect is small. Consequently, the
default rate in this model is procyclical, which is counterfactual.6
Next, we allow ﬁrms to issue equity as well as debt. The friction in obtaining equity ﬁnance
is characterized by a quadratic function that relates the cost of issuing equity to the amount
of equity raised. Equity is procyclical in this framework. The procyclicality of equity is a
consequence of a key property of the debt contract. As was mentioned earlier, the expansion
following an increase in aggregate productivity goes together with an increase in the default
rate. We show that this increases the shadow price of external funds and that this, in turn,
5In Townsend (1979), debt is the optimal type of contract. This suggests that equity should not be used,
which is counterfactual. In quantitative studies with one-period debt as the only form of external ﬁnance, the
calibrated bankruptcy cost parameters are based on much more than veriﬁcation costs (e.g. Carlstrom and
Fuerst 1997; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999), because agency costs have little impact if bankruptcy
costs are to be small. With the alternative interpretation of bankruptcy costs, however, the model no longer
predicts that debt should be the only form of ﬁnance.
6The countercyclical behaviour of the default rate is described in Appendix C.
2increases the amount of equity issuance. Moreover, this eﬀect is stronger for small ﬁrms.
Thus, this very simple framework provides an explanation for the observed procyclicality
of equity issuance and the dependence on ﬁrm size. In our numerical analysis, we show
that allowing for equity issuance strongly diminishes the dampening and the countercyclical
behaviour of the default rate observed in the model with only debt ﬁnance. It cannot,
however, overturn them; i.e., there is no magniﬁcation and no countercyclical default rate.
Although equity issuance is procyclical in this simple model, its ﬂuctuations are much less
volatile than those observed in the data. Retained earnings are also not volatile enough. We
add two features to the model that have been emphasized in the literature—a countercyclical
price of risk and a countercyclical cost of issuing equity—and we show that these features
are eﬀective in generating suﬃcient volatility in equity issuance and retained earnings. We
then show that the model (i) generates a countercyclical default rate, (ii) magniﬁes shocks,
and (iii) generates a stronger cyclical response for small ﬁrms for both equity issuance and
output. The main shortcoming of the model is that the procyclical response for debt decreases
with ﬁrm size, whereas in the data the procyclical behaviour of debt is similar across ﬁrm
categories, except for the group consisting of the very largest ﬁrms.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we show how the ﬁrms’
ﬁnancing sources move over the business cycle. In section 3, we discuss the static version of
our model, which is simple enough to derive some analytic results. In section 4, we discuss the
dynamic model and document the properties of the model. Section 5 oﬀers some conclusions.
2. Cyclical Properties of Financing Sources
2.1 Data set and methodology
The data set consists of annual Compustat data from 1971 to 2004 for publicly listed ﬁrms,
except for ﬁnancial ﬁrms and utilities. To study the importance of ﬁrm size, we rank ﬁrms
using the last period’s end-of-period book value of asset. We then construct J ﬁrm categories
and examine the cyclical behaviour of debt and equity for each group j ∈ {1,...,J}. A ﬁrm
group is deﬁned by a lower and an upper percentile. Our ﬁrm groups are [0,25%], [0,50%],
[0,75%], [0,99%], [90%,95%], [95%,99%], and [99%,100%]. The behaviour of the very largest
ﬁrms is diﬀerent from that of the other ﬁrms. To understand which large ﬁrms behave
diﬀerently, we consider several groups in the top decile.
Table 1 provides a set of summary statistics for each of these groups. In particular, we
3ﬁnd that smaller ﬁrms have lower leverage and exhibit higher asset growth. Smaller ﬁrms
ﬁnance a much larger fraction of asset growth with equity, whereas larger ﬁrms ﬁnance a
larger fraction with debt and retained earnings.7
In this section, we report results for sale of stock, change in (the book value of) eq-
uity,8 gross issuance of long-term debt, change in liabilities, proﬁts, retained earnings, and
dividends.
Our measures for real activity are real GDP and the real value of the group’s assets. We
use two procedures to construct a cyclical measure for ﬁrm ﬁnance. In the ﬂow approach,
the period t observation is the amount of funds raised in period t divided by a trend value
of the assets of the group considered.9 We do not divide by the actual asset value, because
this is also aﬀected by cyclical ﬂuctuations and we would lose information by doing so. For
example, an observed decrease in the ratio of equity relative to assets is consistent with a
decrease as well as an increase in the amount of equity.














t (j) is the trend of the real asset value of ﬁrms in group j, pt is the producer price
level in year t,10 and S$
i,t is the ﬁnancing variable considered. For example, S$
i,t could be the
gross sale of stock during period t or the change in the book value of equity, E$
i,t − E$
i,t−1.
A disadvantage of the ﬂow approach is that some series are quite volatile. In particular,
the series frequently display sharp changes that are reversed in the next period. Therefore,
we also construct a cyclical measure of ﬁrm ﬁnance using the level approach that puts less
emphasis on the high-frequency movements of the data. For equity issuance measures, the









7These results are consistent with those reported in Frank and Goyal (2005).
8Change in equity is deﬁned as in Fama and French (2005). As shown in Appendix C, we obtained very
similar results with the alternative deﬁnition of Baker and Wurgler (2002).
9Scaling by the trend asset value is not enough to render the constructed series stationary, presumably
because of long-term shifts in ﬁrm ﬁnancing. We remove the remaining trend using the HP ﬁlter, but very
similar results are obtained when a linear trend is used.
10We deﬂate with producer prices because we want to measure the purchasing power of the funds raised.
4and subsequent values are deﬁned using
L
E








For debt issuance measures, E$
i,1 in equation (2) is replaced by total liabilities in period 1.
This variable is then logged and the cyclical component is obtained by applying the HP ﬁlter.
LE
t (j) thus measures the accumulated value of the (deﬂated) amount of funds raised through
a particular ﬁnancing form.
We also consider a modiﬁed approach that corrects for possible changes in LE
t (j) caused
by changes in the average ﬁrm size of group j. The results are similar to the results reported
here and they are discussed in Appendix C, which also contains results for the net sale
of stock,11 the change in equity as deﬁned by Baker and Wurgler (2002), net issuance of
long-term debt, and change in total debt.
2.2 Empirical results
In this section, we discuss the cyclical behaviour of equity issuance, debt issuance, proﬁts,
retained earnings, and dividends, as well as the correlation between debt and equity issuance.
2.2.1 Cyclical behaviour of equity
Results for equity issuance are reported in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 uses the level approach
and Table 3 uses the ﬂow approach. The top half of each table uses GDP as the real activity
variable and the bottom half uses the book value of assets. Each panel reports results for
two equity series: the sale of stock and the change in equity.
Correlation between equity ﬁnance and GDP. At the aggregate level, the coeﬃcients
are small and not even the sign is robust. For the sale of stock, the correlation coeﬃcient is
equal to 0.20 and -0.001 for the level and the ﬂow approach, respectively. For the change in
equity, the corresponding coeﬃcients are -0.07 and 0.07.
Although the cyclical behaviour of aggregate equity depends on the particular deﬁnition
11We prefer the gross series over the net sale of stock because, as pointed out by Fama and French (2001,
2005), ﬁrms often repurchase stock and then reissue it to the sellers of an acquisition, to employee stock
ownership plans, and to executives who exercise their stock options. The reissued stock does not show up as
a sale of stock, since it does not lead to cash ﬂow. The repurchases, however, do show up. Thus, although
these transactions leave equity unchanged, they would cause a reduction in sales minus repurchases.
5and methodology used, a robust pattern emerges at the disaggregate level. For both deﬁ-
nitions and both approaches, equity behaviour is procyclical for all ﬁrm groups considered
that exclude the top 5 per cent of ﬁrms. For the level approach, several coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent (or lower) level using a one-sided test. For the ﬂow approach,
fewer coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant.12 The correlation coeﬃcients are higher for the gross series
than for the net, which makes sense, since one can expect repurchases to be procyclical.
In contrast, the correlation of the top 1 per cent of ﬁrms is negative for both deﬁnitions
and approaches. For the level approach, the signiﬁcance levels (using a one-sided test) are
6.3 per cent for the change in equity and less than 1 per cent for the sale of stock. No robust
picture emerges for the sign of the correlation for the group of ﬁrms between the 95th and
the 99th percentile. Although the top 1 per cent of ﬁrms comprise a very small number (only
29, on average), they are important for aggregate behaviour, since the distribution of ﬁrm
size has an extremely fat right tail.
The positive correlation coeﬃcients for the diﬀerent ﬁrm groups indicate that equity is
procyclical, but they do not indicate for which group equity issuance moves the most over the
cycle. To answer this question we plot the cyclical components. Figure 1 plots the cyclical
component of the sale of stock (level approach) and GDP for several ﬁrm categories that all
exclude the top 1 per cent of ﬁrms.13 The following observations can be made. First, the
positive co-movement between equity issuance and real activity is clear.14 Second, cyclical
movements are stronger for smaller ﬁrms. Third, the lead-lag structure seems to change over
time. For example, equity issuance leads GDP slightly in the second half of the eighties, but
it lags GDP slightly in the second half of the nineties; both are periods in which important
ﬂuctuations occur. This means that the magnitude for the correlation coeﬃcients may very
well underestimate the extent to which equity issuance and GDP are correlated.
Correlation between equity ﬁnance and assets. The bottom panels in Tables 2 and 3
report the co-movement of equity issuance and assets.15 The pattern of results is very similar,
but the observed positive correlation is stronger and more signiﬁcant. For example, for the
sale of stock, the correlation coeﬃcients for the bottom 25 per cent of ﬁrms (75 per cent)
12The lower signiﬁcance is not surprising, given the stronger emphasis on higher frequencies.
13Details on the time-series behaviour of the top 1 per cent of ﬁrms are given in Appendix C.
14There is one exception. In the early seventies, the cyclical components of equity and GDP move together
and, in particular, they both decline during the oil crisis. When the cyclical component of GDP recovers,
however, the equity components continue to decline until the recessions of the early eighties, after which they
again move closely with GDP.
15The asset variable is constructed by setting S$
i,t equal to A$
i,t − A$
i,t−1 in equations (1) and (3), for the
ﬂow and the level approach, respectively, and by replacing E$
i,t by A$
i,t in equation (2).
6are equal to 0.91 (0.65) and 0.80 (0.76) for the ﬂow and level approach, respectively, and the
coeﬃcients are highly signiﬁcant. Even for the top 1 per cent of ﬁrms, we ﬁnd some positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
2.2.2 Cyclical behaviour of debt
In this section, we examine the correlation of real activity with long-term debt issuance and
the change in total liabilities. Tables 4 and 5 report the results for the level and the ﬂow
approach, respectively.
Correlation between debt ﬁnance and GDP. At the aggregate level, the correlation
between debt and GDP is positive and signiﬁcant for at least the 5 per cent level (one-
sided test), for both debt measures and for both the level and the ﬂow approach. As with
equity, the results with aggregate data hide heterogeneous behaviour across the diﬀerent ﬁrm
groups. In particular, whereas the correlation coeﬃcients for ﬁrms in the bottom 25 per cent,
bottom 50 per cent, bottom 75 per cent, and even the bottom 99 per cent are positive and
signiﬁcant, the correlation coeﬃcient for the top 1 per cent is insigniﬁcant, small, and for the
level approach even negative.
Figures 2 and 3 plot the cyclical component of GDP, together with the cyclical components
of long-term debt issuance and the net change in total liabilities, respectively. The level
approach is used to construct the ﬁnancing variables. It shows that the cyclical component
for ﬁrms in the bottom 25 per cent, the bottom 50 per cent, and the bottom 99 per cent
move together closely for both debt deﬁnitions. The ﬁgures make clear that the issuance of
long-term debt and the change in liabilities lag the cycle, which is also made clear by the
higher correlation coeﬃcients of the debt variables with lagged GDP.
Figures 2 and 3 provide no reason to believe that changes in debt issuance over the
business cycle are quantitatively more important for smaller ﬁrms. The one episode where
a much sharper increase and subsequent decrease are observed for groups that exclude the
larger ﬁrms is in the ﬁrst half of the seventies. Here, debt issuance lags output, however, so
that debt is still increasing while GDP is already contracting.
Correlation between debt ﬁnance and assets. As with equity, the diﬀerences between
the diﬀerent ﬁrm categories are smaller when assets are used as the real activity variable.
For long-term debt issuance, it is still the case that the correlation coeﬃcients are smaller for
7the larger ﬁrms, but they are always positive, even for the top 1 per cent of ﬁrms (although
not signiﬁcant for the ﬂow approach). Interestingly, a very uniform pattern of high and
signiﬁcant correlation coeﬃcients is observed for the change in total liabilities. That is, the
correlation coeﬃcients are above 0.9 for both approaches, even for the top 1 per cent of ﬁrms.
2.2.3 Co-movement of equity and debt
Table 6 reports the correlation between the gross equity and the gross debt measure (i.e.,
the change in equity and the change in liabilities), as well as the correlation between the
net equity and the net debt measure (i.e., the sale of stock and long-term debt issuance).
The correlation coeﬃcients are almost all positive for diﬀerent ﬁrm categories, deﬁnitions,
and approaches. Several coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant. The only negative contemporaneous
coeﬃcient is found for the [95%,99%] size category using the gross measures and the ﬂow
approach.
We have shown that the cyclical behaviour of equity and debt issues is quite diﬀerent for
ﬁrms in the top 1 per cent. Nevertheless, the correlation of the two external ﬁnancing sources
for the top 1 per cent has the same sign as the coeﬃcients for the smaller ﬁrms (i.e., positive).
Several coeﬃcients for the top 1 per cent are highly signiﬁcant. This result, combined with
the fact that debt and equity for the top 1 per cent are positively correlated with assets,
suggests that part of the diﬀerence between small and large ﬁrms is the cyclical behaviour
of assets.16 Below, we show that the diﬀerential cyclical behaviour of proﬁts and retained
earnings is also important.
Using the ﬂow-of-funds data from the Federal Reserve Board, Jermann and Quadrini
(2006) ﬁnd that aggregate equity issuance is countercyclical, aggregate debt issuance is pro-
cyclical, and aggregate equity and aggregate debt are negatively correlated. For some mea-
sures, we also ﬁnd equity issuance to be countercyclical at the aggregate level. The positive
correlation between equity and debt, however, is a robust ﬁnding when Compustat data are
used.17 This suggests that there is a diﬀerence between Compustat data and the ﬂow-of-funds
data used by Jermann and Quadrini (2006). The ﬂow-of-funds series are net, so leveraged
16In fact, the correlation coeﬃcient (t-statistic) for the cyclical components of assets and GDP is equal to
0.39 (2.54) and 0.47 (3.59) for ﬁrms in the bottom 25 per cent and bottom 75 per cent, respectively, while it
is -0.02 (-0.08) for ﬁrms in the top 1 per cent.
17In Appendix C, we consider alternative series and ﬁnd one exception. Using the ﬂow approach and net
sale of stock, we ﬁnd a negative signiﬁcant correlation between debt and equity issuance. As pointed out
by Fama and French (2001, 2005), however, net sale of stock does not deal correctly with reissues of stock.
This measurement error works in the direction of making the series less procyclical. More details are given
in Appendix C.
8buyouts could be behind the negative correlation between equity issuance and debt issuance.
Indeed, Baker and Wurgler (2000) argue that the merger waves in the eighties and nineties
are quantitatively important for ﬂuctuations in the ﬂow-of-funds net equity and net debt
series.
A reduction in equity because of a leveraged buyout does not show up in our equity
series.18,19 One could argue, however, that one should not clean the data for the eﬀects of
leveraged buyouts when trying to discover the cyclical behaviour of debt and equity issuance.
Although leveraged buyouts do occur in concentrated waves, they occur when economic
conditions are very favorable; that is, one could argue that they are procyclical. Note,
however, that although this question is important for the cyclicality of the aggregate series,
it is not important for the cyclicality of the majority of ﬁrms, since mainly the largest ﬁrms
are aﬀected by mergers.
2.2.4 Cyclical behaviour of retained earnings, proﬁts, and dividends
In Table 7, we report the cyclical behaviour of retained earnings, proﬁts, and dividends. We
report results only for the ﬂow approach.20 There is again a striking diﬀerence between the
results for small and large ﬁrms. Whereas retained earnings are procyclical and signiﬁcant for
large ﬁrms, they are countercyclical (but insigniﬁcant) for small ﬁrms. The countercyclicality
for the bottom 25 per cent, 50 per cent, and 75 per cent is due to ﬁrms in the bottom 25
per cent. For ﬁrms between the 25th and the 50th percentile, the correlation is 0.20 with a
t-statistic of 1.24. For ﬁrms between the 50th and the 75th percentile, the correlation is 0.29
and signiﬁcant with a t-statistic of 2.56. The cyclical behaviour of proﬁts mimics that of
retained earnings; that is, countercyclical and insigniﬁcant for small ﬁrms, but signiﬁcantly
procyclical for large ﬁrms. One possible explanation for the countercyclical behaviour of
proﬁts for small ﬁrms is the stronger procyclical behaviour of assets.21 When assets are used
as the real activity measure, then both the countercyclical behaviour of retained earnings
18Also, Jermann and Quadrini (2006) analyze the correlation between GDP and aggregate net equity
payouts as a fraction of GDP. Equity payouts are dividends minus net equity issuance. With this measure, it
is more likely to attain a countercyclical equity issuance, since it is net of dividend payments and is expressed
as a fraction of GDP.
19A reduction in equity obviously would not show up in the gross series. It also would not show up in the
net series, since a ﬁrm that disappears from the sample because of a merger is not used in the construction
of the set of ﬁrm observations in that period. Firms involved in major mergers (Compustat footnote code
AB) are eliminated from the sample.
20The level approach takes the log of retained earnings. For those among the smallest ﬁrms, retained
earnings are persistently negative. This means that accumulated earnings at some point become negative
and one cannot take the log anymore.
21See footnote 16.
9and proﬁts for small ﬁrms and the procyclical behaviour of large ﬁrms become stronger.
The correlation coeﬃcients for dividends are typically positive and often signiﬁcant. The
correlation is stronger when GDP is used instead of assets, especially for ﬁrms in the bottom
25 per cent. Thus, dividends typically increase during good times, but more so when good
times are characterized as increases in overall activity than by increases in overall ﬁrm assets.
This is to be expected, since the higher investments are likely to put pressure on dividends.
3. Static Model
In this section, we develop a one-period version of the model. The simplicity will be help-
ful in understanding some undesirable implications of the standard debt contract, such as
dampening of shocks and procyclicality of the default rate. More importantly, the analy-
sis will bring to light one important reason why equity issuance is procyclical: namely, the
procyclical behaviour of the shadow price of external funds.
3.1 Debt contract
3.1.1 Description of ﬁrm ﬁnancing problem
Technology is given by
θωk
α + (1 − δ)k, (4)
where k stands for the amount of capital, θ for the aggregate productivity shock (with
θ > 0), ω for the idiosyncratic productivity shock (with ω ≥ 0 and E(ω) = 1), and δ for
the depreciation rate. The value of θ is known at the beginning of the period when the debt
contract is written, but ω is observed only at the end of the period.
It is standard to assume that (i) agency problems are present only in the sector that
produces investment commodities, and (ii) technology in this sector is linear (that is, α =
1). The linearity assumption is convenient for computational reasons, since it means that
agency costs do not depend on ﬁrm size and a representative ﬁrm can be used. Neither
the assumptions nor the implication that ﬁrm size does not matter is appealing. Therefore,
we use a standard non-linear production function, and agency problems are present in all
sectors.22
22Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2006) show that ﬁnancial frictions in the investment sector correspond
to “investment wedges,” and they argue that these have played at best a minor role in several important
economic downturns.
10The ﬁrm’s net worth is equal to n and debt ﬁnance occurs through one-period contracts.
That is, the borrower and lender agree on a debt amount, (k −n), and a borrowing rate, rb.
The ﬁrm defaults if resources in the ﬁrm are not enough to pay back the amount due. That
is, the ﬁrm defaults if ω is less than the default threshold, ω, where ω satisﬁes
θωk
α + (1 − δ)k = (1 + r
b)(k − n). (5)
If the ﬁrm defaults, then the lender gets
θωk
α + (1 − δ)k − µθk
α, (6)
where µ represents bankruptcy costs, which are assumed to be a fraction of expected rev-
enues.23 In an economy with µ > 0, defaults are ineﬃcient and would not happen if the
ﬁrst-best solution could be implemented. Bankruptcy costs are assumed to be unavoidable,
however, and the borrower and the lender cannot renegotiate the contract. The idea is that
the situation in which ﬁrms do not have enough resources to pay the contractually agreed
upon payments is like a distress state, involving, for example, loss of conﬁdence, loss of sales,
distress sales of assets, and loss of proﬁts.24
Using (5), the ﬁrm’s expected income can be written as
θk
αF(ω) with F(ω) =
∞ Z
ω
ωdΦ(ω) − (1 − Φ(ω))ω, (7)
and the lender’s expected revenues as
θk
αG(ω) + (1 − δ)k with G(ω) = 1 − F(ω) − µΦ(ω), (8)
where Φ(ω) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the idiosyncratic productivity
shock, which we assume to be diﬀerentiable.
The values of (k,ω) are chosen to maximize the expected end-of-period ﬁrm income
23The results in this section occur if bankruptcy costs are a fraction of actual output, θωkα, or a fraction
of the interest payments.
24In the framework of Townsend (1979), bankruptcy costs are veriﬁcation costs and debt is the optimal
contract. It is not clear to us, however, that veriﬁcation costs are large enough to induce quantitatively
interesting agency problems. Indeed, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) include estimates for lost sales and lost
proﬁts, and set µ equal to 0.25 in their calibration. Under this alternative interpretation of bankruptcy costs,
debt would no longer be the optimal contract. Convenience and history, however, may also be important
reasons behind the dominant use of debt contracts in obtaining external ﬁnance.





θkαF(ω) + ζ [θkαG(ω) + (1 − δ)k − (1 + r)(k − n)]
s.t. ζ ≥ 0,
(9)
where ζ is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the bank’s break-even constraint. Rewrit-







This equation makes clear the role of the depreciation rate. Incomplete depreciation (i.e.,
δ < 1) allows the ﬁrm to leverage its net worth. That is, the lower the depreciation rate,
the larger the share of available resources that is not subject to idiosyncratic risk. For this
reason, the bank can lend out a positive amount (i.e., k > n), even if the ﬁrm always defaults;
i.e., even if ω = G(ω) = 0.
For an interior solution, the optimal values for k and ω satisfy the break-even condition
of the bank (10) and the ﬁrst-order condition:
αθkα−1F(ω)





The Lagrange multiplier, ζ, can be expressed as a function of ω alone, and is always greater






1 − µΦ0(ω)/(1 − Φ(ω))
≥ 1. (12)
3.1.2 Properties of the default rate
Assumption A
• The maximization problem has an interior solution.25
25This is not necessarily the case. For example, if aggregate productivity is low, depreciation is high,
bankruptcy costs are high, and/or the CDF of ω has a lot of mass close to zero, then k = n may be the
optimal outcome.
12• At the optimal value of ω, the CDF satisﬁes
∂ (Φ0(ω)/(1 − Φ(ω)))
∂ω
> 0. (13)
This inequality is a weak condition and is satisﬁed if the density, Φ0(ω), is non-zero and
non-decreasing at ω.26 The following proposition characterizes the behaviour of the default
rate.
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption A holds. Then,
dω
dn
= 0 when α = 1,
dω
dn
< 0 when α < 1, and
dω
dθ
> 0 when n > 0.
dω
dθ
= 0 when n = 0, and α < 1.
The proofs of the proposition are given in the Appendix A. The ﬁrst two parts of the
proposition say that an increase in the ﬁrm’s net worth has no eﬀect on the default rate
when technology is linear (i.e., α = 1), but reduces the default rate when technology exhibits
diminishing returns (i.e., α < 1). This is an interesting result, since it makes clear that, for
the case considered in the literature (i.e., the case with α = 1), an increase in net worth,
which is the key variable of the net-worth channel, does not lead to a reduction in the default
rate. The last part of the proposition says that an increase in aggregate productivity increases
the default rate, except when n = 0.27 That is, an increase in θ changes the ﬁrm’s trade-
oﬀ between expansion (higher k) and less defaults (lower ω) in favour of expansion. More
intuition is provided in Appendix A.
With α = 1, an increase in θ therefore leads to an increase in the default rate and any
subsequent increase in net worth would not eﬀect it. With α = 1 and without further
modiﬁcations, dynamic models with the standard debt contract would, thus, generate a
26Such an assumption is standard in the literature. For example, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
assume that ∂ (ωdΦ(ω)/(1 − Φ(ω))/∂ω > 0, which would be the corresponding condition if bankruptcy costs
are—as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)—a fraction of actual (as opposed to expected) revenues.
27The last part of the proposition imposes that α < 1, because when n = 0 the problem is not well deﬁned
for α = 1.
13procyclical default rate, which is counterfactual.28 With α < 1, the increase in n that
follows an increase in θ does have a downward eﬀect on the default rate, but we never ﬁnd
this eﬀect to be large enough to generate a countercyclical default rate in a model with only
debt.
3.1.3 Dampening frictions
Cochrane (1994) argues that there are few external sources of randomness that are very
volatile. The challenge for the literature is therefore to build models in which small shocks
can lead to substantial ﬂuctuations. The debt contract has the unfortunate property that it
dampens shocks. That is, the responses of real activity and capital in the model with the
debt contract are actually less than the responses when there are no frictions in obtaining
external ﬁnance. This is summarized in the following proposition. Let y be aggregate output
and let ynet be aggregate output net of bankruptcy costs. Also, let e k and e y be the solution
to capital and aggregate output in the model without frictions, respectively.






















To understand this proposition, it is important to understand that net worth, n, is ﬁxed
when aggregate productivity, θ, changes. For example, consider an enormous drop in θ.
Suddenly, n becomes very large relative to θ, but this means that frictions no longer matter.
The disappearance of the agency problem implies that the eﬀect of the drop in θ is less.
Therefore, it is key that n > 0. The proof in Appendix A makes it clear that if n = 0, then
there is no such increase in n/θ when θ decreases. Consequently, the percentage change in
capital and output is equal to that of the frictionless model if n = 0.
28To alleviate this problem, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) assume that aggregate productivity
is not known when the contract is written. Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2006) generate a countercyclical
default rate by letting idiosyncratic risk decrease with aggregate productivity.
143.1.4 Tax advantage and optimal leverage
Applying the envelope condition to (9) gives
∂w(n;θ)
∂n
= ζ(ω)(1 + r). (16)
Equation (12) implies that the Lagrange multiplier, ζ(ω), is strictly bigger than 1 as long
as defaults are non-zero. Consequently, adding a unit of net worth to the ﬁrm increases
end-of-period ﬁrm value by more than 1+r, and ﬁrms have the incentive to drive debt down
to the point where ω is equal to zero. That is, in the model described so far, there is no
beneﬁt of debt to balance bankruptcy costs.
The trade-oﬀ theory of corporate ﬁnance argues that the deductibility of interest payments
provides such a beneﬁt and leads to an optimal leverage ratio at which defaults are still
relevant.29 In the dynamic model discussed below, we assume that taxes are a fraction of
corporate proﬁts. Here, we assume that after-tax cash on hand is simply a ﬁxed fraction of
before-tax cash on hand, which simpliﬁes the analysis without aﬀecting the point we want to
make. In particular, the advantage of this less realistic way to model taxes is that the problem
is almost unchanged, except that the objective of the ﬁrm and the Lagrange multiplier are




= ζ(ω)(1 + r) =
(1 − τ)(1 + r)
1 − µΦ0(ω)/(1 − Φ(ω))
. (17)
For a high enough level of net worth, ω = 0, ζ < 1, and the internal rate of return is less
than 1 + r.30 When n = 0, the internal rate of return exceeds 1 + r, as long as the tax rate
is not too high. Continuity then implies that there is a level of net worth, n∗, such that the
internal rate of return is equal to 1 + r. Equation (17) then implies that, at this level of net
worth, ω > 0.
If the owner could attract external equity and transact at the market rate r, then the ﬁrm’s
net worth would always be equal to n∗. The owner would attract equity when n < n∗ (i.e.,
when the internal rate of return exceeds r), and would take money out of the ﬁrm when
n > n∗ (i.e., when the internal rate of return is less than r). In other words, the optimal
29Graham (2000) ﬁnds that the tax beneﬁts of debt are, on average, equivalent to 10 per cent of the value
of the ﬁrm, and therefore quite substantial.
30With δ < 1, the point at which ω = 0 is possible with positive debt levels. In particular, equation (10)
implies that, at n = (δ + r)e k/(1 + r), the ﬁrst-best solution of the capital stock, e k, can be implemented and
ω = 0.
15leverage ratio is equal to (k∗ − n∗)/k∗, where k∗ is the optimal level of capital corresponding
to n = n∗.31
3.2 Equity contract
A key theoretical question we want to answer is what the cyclical behaviour of equity is if
we modify the model in which the ﬁrm can obtain funds only through the standard debt
contract by allowing for equity issuance. We use a reduced-form approach to model the
friction associated with obtaining equity ﬁnancing. The simplicity is helpful to highlight the
channel we identify.
3.2.1 Costs of issuing equity
We follow Cooley and Quadrini (2001), using a reduced-form approach and assuming that
equity costs are increasing with the amount of equity raised. Whereas Cooley and Quadrini
(2001) assume that the cost of issuing equity is linear, we assume that these costs are
quadratic; that is, λ(e) = λ0e2 for e > 0.32 Because of these costs, the net worth of ﬁrms
does not jump instantaneously to the optimal level, n∗. Instead, for any level n < n∗, some
equity will be issued to reduce the gap. Since there are no costs to issue dividends, a ﬁrm
can reduce its level of net worth to n∗ instantaneously.
Equity issuance costs in our model are like underwriting fees, and it does not matter
whether the current or the new owners pay them. Alternatively, one could interpret the
equity issuance costs as a reduced-form representation for losses due to an adverse-selection
problem that ﬁrms face when convincing others to become co-owners. The question arises
as to whether such an adverse-selection problem should not aﬀect the debt problem. To
some extent it probably should, and it would be worthwhile to construct a framework that
analyzes the eﬀect of diﬀerent frictions on diﬀerent types of contracts.
31Business cycle models that incorporate frictions typically assume that the discount rate of the entrepre-
neur exceeds the market interest rate. This also assumes that, at some point, the entrepreneur prefers to
take funds out of the ﬁrm. Incorporating the tax advantage allows us to do this without relying on such an
assumption, which is hard to verify.
32This avoids a non-diﬀerentiability when zero equity is being issued. Jermann and Quadrini (2006) also
assume a quadratic cost of issuing equity. Hansen and Torregrosa (1992), and Altinkili¸ c and Hansen (2000),
show that underwriting fees do indeed display increasing marginal costs.
163.2.2 Description of the equity issuance problem
At the beginning of the period, the ﬁrm chooses equity, e, and debt issuance, k − n =
k−(e+x). A lender that buys equity (debt) does not obtain any information that is helpful
in alleviating the friction of the debt (equity) contract. Recall that w(n;θ) is the expected
end-of-period value of a ﬁrm that starts with net worth equal to n. The equity issuance
decision is represented by the following maximization problem:
v(x;θ) = max
e,s (1 − s)
w(x+e;θ)
1+r







where s is the ownership fraction that the providers of new equity obtain in exchange for
e. In this speciﬁcation, it is assumed that the equity issuance costs are paid by the outside
investor, but this is irrelevant.33
The expected rate of return for equity providers is equal to
αw(x + e,θ) − (e + λ(e))
e + λ(e)
=
(1 + r)(e + λ(e)) − (e + λ(e))
e + λ(e)
= r.
That is, providers of equity ﬁnancing obtain the same expected rate of return as debt
providers.









That is, the marginal cost of issuing one unit of equity, 1+∂λ/∂e, has to equal the expected
beneﬁt. Since ∂λ/∂e is equal to zero at e = 0, the ﬁrm will issue equity whenever ∂w/∂e >
1 + r. Since ∂λ/∂e > 0 for e > 0, however, the ﬁrm does not increase equity up to the point
where ∂w/∂e = 1 + r.
3.2.3 Cyclicality of equity issuance
In this section, we address the question of how equity issuance responds to an increase in
aggregate productivity. Clearly, when aggregate productivity is high, the need for external
ﬁnance increases. This suggests that equity issuance should increase during a boom. But
33The maximization problem in (18) and the problem in which issuance costs are paid by the ﬁrm corre-
spond to maximizing w(x + e;θ)/(1 + r) − e − λ(e) with respect to e.
17since another form of ﬁnance is possible, it may also be the case that there is a substitution
out of equity into debt. The following proposition shows that the latter is not the case in
our model.34
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumption A holds. Then,
de
dθ
> 0 for n > 0. (20)
That is, when aggregate productivity increases, ﬁrms that issue equity will issue more,
and ﬁrms that issue dividends (e < 0) will reduce dividends and possibly even issue equity.
This result is driven by the result of Proposition 1 that the shadow price of external funds and
the default probability increase with aggregate productivity (for a given value of net worth,
n = x + e).35 Even though the ﬁrm could obtain more debt ﬁnancing without additional
equity, the rise in the default rate increases the Lagrange multiplier of the bank’s break-even
condition and therefore increases the value of additional equity. Empirical evidence for this
channel is provided by Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2006), who show that the shadow cost
of external funds exhibits strong cyclical variation. Livdan, Sapriza, and Zhang (2006) also
generate a procyclical shadow price of external funds. In their model, this result is driven by
the assumption that the discount factor is countercyclical, which leads to a strong demand
for investment. In our model, the result is caused by the properties of the standard debt
contract.
4. Dynamic Model
In this section, we ﬁrst discuss the prototype dynamic model, which is a straightforward
modiﬁcation of the static model. We then discuss the benchmark model, which includes two
additional features to generate procyclical equity issuance.
34Levy and Hennessy (2006) develop a model in which equity is procyclical and debt is countercyclical,
whereas Jermann and Quadrini (2006) develop a model in which equity is countercyclical and debt is pro-
cyclical. See section 5 for a further discussion.
35For low n, the magnitude of de/dθ increases with ﬁrm size, but at some point the relationship reverses
and equity issuance decreases as net worth increases. The reason is as follows. Above, we showed that
dω/dθ = 0 if n = 0. Consequently, de/dθ = 0 if n = 0. For n close to zero, the response will be close to zero.
For large enough n, frictions do not matter and dω/dθ will be small as well. In our quantitative work, we
ﬁnd that de/dθ decreases with ﬁrm size for most observed values for n. This is partly due to the fact that,
with an endogenous equity decision, small values of n are not chosen.
184.1 Prototype dynamic model
4.1.1 Technology
In addition to making ﬁrms forward looking, the dynamic prototype model has some fea-
tures that are not present in the static model. All are related to technology. The ﬁrst is
the speciﬁcation of the law of motion for productivity. Second, we introduce two minor
changes in technology that are helpful in letting the model match some key statistics, such as
leverage and the fraction of ﬁrms that pay dividends. In particular, we introduce stochastic
depreciation and a small ﬁxed cost.
Productivity. The law of motion for aggregate productivity, θt, is given by
ln(θt+1) = ln(¯ θ)(1 − ρ) + ρln(θt) + σεεt+1, (21)
where εt is an identically, independently distributed (i.i.d.) random variable with a standard
normal distribution.
Stochastic depreciation. For typical depreciation rates, ﬁrms default only for very low
realizations of the idiosyncratic shock, because undepreciated capital provides a safety buﬀer.
This generates high leverage. An important reason behind observed defaults is that the
value of ﬁrm assets has deteriorated over time; for example, because the technology has
become outdated. To capture this idea, we introduce stochastic depreciation, which makes it
possible to generate reasonable default probabilities while keeping the average depreciation
rate unchanged. In particular, depreciation depends on the same idiosyncratic shock that
aﬀects production, and is equal to
δ(ωt) = δ0 exp(δ1ωt). (22)
Fixed costs. For realistic tax rates, proﬁts are high, which in turn implies that a high
fraction of ﬁrms pay out dividends. We introduce a ﬁxed cost, η, so that the model can
match the observed fraction of dividend payers. Given the importance of internal funds, it
is important to match data on funds being taken out of the ﬁrm.
194.1.2 Debt and equity contract
At the beginning of the period, aggregate productivity, θt, and the amount of cash on hand,
xt, are known. After θt is observed, each ﬁrm makes the dividend/equity decision and at the
same time issues bonds. In the dynamic version, a ﬁrm takes into account its continuation
value and maximizes its expected end-of-period value, instead of end-of-period cash on hand.
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Note that taxes are a constant fraction of taxable income, which is deﬁned as operating
proﬁts net of depreciation and interest expense. The speciﬁcation of the equity contract is
still given by equation (18), but w(·) is now given by equation (23).
4.1.3 Number of ﬁrms
Our model has a ﬁxed number of heterogeneous ﬁrms. A ﬁrm that defaults on its debt is
replaced by a new ﬁrm that starts with zero cash on hand.37
4.1.4 Supply of funds
Our data set covers a subset of all ﬁrms. It does not include ﬁnancial ﬁrms, utilities, and
ﬁrms that are not publicly listed.38 Although ﬁrms outside this group also obtain external
ﬁnancing,39 we think that our model is most suited to describe ﬁrms in the corporate sector;
36This would be the correct default cut-oﬀ if ﬁrms could default and restart with zero initial funds. We also
analyzed the model under the assumption that ﬁrms default when v(xt+1;θt+1) < 0. Since v(0;θt+1) > 0,
this means that ﬁrms default only when cash on hand is suﬃciently negative. The model with the alternative
speciﬁcation is more diﬃcult to solve, but generates very similar results.
37See Covas (2004) for a model in which the number of ﬁrms is determined by a free-entry condition.
38We have employment numbers for 94 per cent of our ﬁrms. Total employment for these ﬁrms is equal to
35 million, which is roughly one quarter of total U.S. employment.
39See Berger and Udell (1998).
20i.e., publicly listed ﬁrms and closely held ﬁrms. In the prototype version of the model,
we assume that investors who provide funds to this sector through debt or equity earn an
expected rate of return equal to r. The rate that ﬁrms pay for external ﬁnance is equal to this
constant rate plus the external ﬁnance premium, which varies with net worth and aggregate
conditions. In the benchmark model, discussed below, the required rate of return on equity
varies according to an exogenously speciﬁed process. Using an exogenous process for the
required rate of return has the advantage that the model remains tractable and generates
cyclical properties for the required rates of return of risky assets that are consistent with the
data.
Without an exogenously given process for the required rate of return for investors, it
would be diﬃcult to solve the model, because it would require keeping track of the cross-
sectional distribution of ﬁrms’ net worth levels. We have made no attempt to try to solve
such a model. Algorithms to solve models with heterogeneous households (and homogeneous
ﬁrms) have only recently been developed, and adding a cross-sectional distribution for our
already complex setting would be quite a challenge.40 Moreover, to generate realistic pricing
kernels would require a lot more than just adding a risk-averse household to the model.41
4.2 Benchmark model
In the prototype model discussed so far, equity issuance is cyclical for the same reason that
∂e/∂θ > 0 in the static model. That is, the desire to expand when θ increases leads to
an increase in the default rate, which makes the break-even constraint of the bank more
binding and increases the value of additional net worth. In this section, we describe the
benchmark model, which modiﬁes the prototype model in two aspects. Both modiﬁcations
provide reasons for equity issuance to be procyclical in addition to the reason identiﬁed with
the prototype model.
A countercyclical price of risk. The risk premium on risky investments varies counter-
cyclically.42 This means that the end-of-period value of the ﬁrm in (18) should be discounted
at a lower rate during good times, which in turn leads to an additional increase in the amount
40See den Haan (1996, 1997), Krusell and Smith (1997), and Algan, Allais, and den Haan (2006).
41Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) are quite successful in replicating key asset-price properties, but
they use preferences that display habit formation, investment that is subject to adjustment costs, multiple
sectors, and costs to move resources across sectors.
42For empirical evidence on the countercyclical price of risk, see Fama and French (1989), Schwert (1989),
and Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000).
21of equity being issued. To capture the cyclical variation in the required rate of return, we







Countercyclical issuance costs. One reason for the issuance cost is the concern that a
ﬁrm has an incentive to issue equity when it has private information that it is overvalued by
the market. According to Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993), this concern is countercyclical,
for the following reason. Firm value is aﬀected by idiosyncratic and aggregate factors. The
concern that the ﬁrm is exploiting private information is most likely to be related to the idio-
syncratic component. Consequently, if aggregate conditions improve, then the idiosyncratic
component becomes less important and reduces the concern of investors to buy overvalued







4.3 Results for the prototype model
This section reports results for the prototype version, in which the equity issuance cost and
the discount factor for ﬁrms’ dividends do not vary over the business cycle. The parameters
used are identical to the calibrated parameter values of the benchmark model discussed below,
except that λ1 = γ = 0.
We report results for the bottom tercile (small ﬁrms) and top tercile (large ﬁrms). This
gives a good idea about the heterogeneity in our model economy. The data exhibit more
heterogeneity. This is also true if we exclude ﬁrms in the right tail of the distribution, for
which we found deviating cyclical behaviour. One reason for the limited heterogeneity in the
model is that dividend-paying ﬁrms reduce their net worth to the same optimal level and are,
thus, identical until the next idiosyncratic shock is realized. These ﬁrms account for roughly
half the ﬁrms in our artiﬁcial sample. We discuss this issue further in section 5.
For a typical ﬁrm in the bottom tercile, ﬁnancial frictions are quantitatively important,
and additional equity issuance helps to reduce them. In contrast, for a ﬁrm in the top
tercile, ﬁnancial frictions may still be present, but they are less important. In particular,
the tax advantage of debt often outweighs the remaining bankruptcy costs and dividends are
therefore important for ﬁrms in this category.
22Figure 4 shows how output and the default rate respond to a one-standard-deviation
positive shock to aggregate productivity. In addition to the responses for the prototype
model, it also shows the responses for the frictionless model and the model with only debt
as external ﬁnance. The results are discussed in the remainder of this section.
The model without equity issuance. Figure 4 shows that, in the “only debt” model,
the default rate increases sharply when aggregate productivity increases, which is counter-
factual. Even for ﬁrms in the top tercile, there is a small increase in the default rate, but
the counterfactual movement of the default rate is much more important for small ﬁrms.
The stronger countercyclical movement in the default rate for small ﬁrms corresponds with
a weaker procyclical output response for small ﬁrms, which is also counterfactual.
Dampening in the diﬀerent models. When we examine the output responses, we ﬁnd
that the diﬀerences between the diﬀerent models are most pronounced for small ﬁrms. For
example, in the model without equity issuance, output increases by less than output in the
frictionless version of the model. In particular, the ﬁrst-period response of output in the
“only debt” model is 15.3 per cent less than the response in the frictionless version. In the
model with equity issuance, the response of output is still less, but the ﬁrst-period response
is only 6.6 per cent less than the response in the frictionless model.
The model with equity issuance. In the prototype model, equity issuance increases in
response to a positive productivity shock, and the subsequent increase in net worth ensures
that there is no longer a sharp increase in the default rate of small ﬁrms. Recall that the
non-linearity in the production function plays a key role, because with a linear production
function the increase in net worth would have had no eﬀect on the default rate. The inﬂow
of external equity causes the ﬁrst-period response of output for small ﬁrms in the prototype
model to exceed the response in the “only debt” model by 10.2 per cent. For large ﬁrms,
the model even generates a small decrease in the default rate, since, with positive tax rates,
ω > 0 at n∗
t (the level of n at which a ﬁrm takes money out of the ﬁrm). Even large ﬁrms
face some (small) probability of default. When aggregate productivity increases, the value of
n∗
t increases, which implies that large ﬁrms reduce dividends and the higher net worth levels
correspond with lower default rates. The eﬀect is very small, however, since agency problems
are not very important for large ﬁrms.
23The default rate does not go down in the prototype model, unless the ﬁrm is very large
and xt > n∗
t. The reason is that—unless equity issuance is increased because of the increase
in n∗
t—equity increases because the desire to expand leads to an increase in the default rate.
4.4 Calibration of the benchmark model
The model period is one year, which is consistent with the empirical analysis. For the
discount factor, β = (1+r)−1, the tax rate, τ, the persistence of the aggregate shock, ρ, and
the curvature parameter in the production function, α, we use values that are used in related
studies. Its values, together with a reference source, are given in the top panel of Table 8.
The benchmark value of α is equal to 0.70. It is standard to use higher values of α in models
without labour.43 We will also discuss the results based on a much lower value of α.
The other parameters are chosen to match some key ﬁrst- and second-order moments
that our model should satisfy. The parameter values and the moments we target are given in
the bottom panel of Table 8. Although the parameters determine the values of the moments
simultaneously, we indicate in the discussion below which parameter is most inﬂuential for a
particular moment. In the table, this parameter is listed in the same row as the corresponding
moment. The set of targeted ﬁrst-order moments is as follows:
• The ratio of investment to assets, which is pinned down by the parameter that controls
average depreciation, δ0.
• The fraction of ﬁrms that pay dividends, which is pinned down by the ﬁxed cost, η.
Note that the ﬁxed cost aﬀects proﬁtability and, thus, the rate of return on internal
funds. The ﬁxed cost is equal to 17.1 per cent of average aggregate output.
• The default rate, which is pinned down by the bankruptcy cost, µ. Our value of µ is
equal to 0.15, which implies that bankruptcy costs are, on average, 2.9 per cent of the
value of the ﬁrm, v(ωθkα + (1 − δ(ω))k).
• The default premium and leverage, which are pinned down by the volatility of the
idiosyncratic shock, σω, and the parameter that controls the volatility of depreciation,
43Cooper and Ejarque (2003) use a value equal to 0.7; Hennessy and Whited (2005) estimate α to be equal
to 0.551; Hennessy and Whited (2006) estimate α to be equal to 0.693 for small ﬁrms and equal to 0.577 for
large ﬁrms; and Pratap and Rendon (2003) estimate α to be between 0.53 and 0.60. It is easy to show that a
problem in which technology is given by kαklαl and the wage is constant is equivalent to a problem in which
technology is given by kα with α = αk/(1 − αl). When the original production function satisﬁes diminishing
returns (for example, because of a ﬁxed factor), then α < 1.
24δ1. The higher are σω and δ1, the less certainty exists about the amount of available
funds within the ﬁrm, and the higher the premium on debt ﬁnance.
• Change in equity to assets, which is pinned down by the parameter that controls the
cost of issuing equity, λ0.
The set of targeted second-order moments is as follows:
• The volatility of aggregate asset growth, which is pinned down by the standard devia-
tion of the innovation to productivity, σε.
• The volatility of change in equity, which is pinned down by the parameter that controls
the variation in the cost of issuing equity, λ1.
• The volatility of retained earnings, which is pinned down by the parameter that controls
the variations in the price of risk, γ.
Time-varying discount factor versus time-varying issuance cost. The volatility of
equity issuance and the volatility of retained earnings are controlled by the two features that
distinguish the benchmark from the prototype model; i.e., the countercyclical variation in
the cost of issuing equity and a countercyclical price of risk. Both increase the response of
equity issuance to a positive productivity shock for ﬁrms that already issue equity. They
diﬀer, however, in how they aﬀect ﬁrms that issue dividends and, thus, diﬀer in how they
aﬀect retained earnings. For a ﬁrm that does not issue equity, a reduction in the cost of
issuing equity has no direct eﬀect. It still aﬀects the ﬁrm indirectly, because it may be hit
by some bad shocks in the future, in which case equity ﬁnance does become relevant again.
Since the ﬁrm is forward looking, it would take this into account. In contrast, an increase in
the discount factor does have a direct eﬀect on ﬁrms that issue dividends. For a ﬁrm that
























But an increase in the discount factor increases the left-hand side of the inequality. Conse-
quently, an increase in the discount factor implies that ﬁrms start paying dividends for higher
levels of xt. This means that ﬁrms that issue dividends will issue less and some of them will
even start issuing equity.
25Generated changes in discount factor and issuance cost The prototype model pro-
vides a theoretical reason why equity issuance should be procyclical: the properties of the
standard debt contract cause the shadow price of external funds to be procyclical. In the
benchmark model, there are two additional features that reinforce the cyclical behaviour of
equity: a countercyclical price of risk and a countercyclical cost of issuing equity. The cycli-
cal behaviour of these two features is controlled by two parameters: γ and λ1. Parameters
are calibrated to match the unconditional standard deviation of equity issuance and retained
earnings. The model does a good job in generating procyclical equity issuance and retained
earnings, on average. Note that we use the same discount factor and the same equity issuance
cost function for all ﬁrms. Nevertheless, we will show below that the cyclical variation in
equity issuance is much stronger for small ﬁrms. It may very well be that the sensitivities
of the discount factor and equity issuance cost to the business cycle are stronger for small
ﬁrms. In fact, Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) provide evidence that the required rate
of return is more cyclical for small ﬁrms than for large ﬁrms. Allowing for the cyclicality in
the discount factor and the equity issuance cost to be ﬁrm-dependent would only strengthen
the prediction that equity issuance is more cyclical for small ﬁrms.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the magnitude of the implied changes in the
discount factor and equity issuance costs. The standard deviation of the required rate of
return is equal to 0.16 percentage points. Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) do not
report numbers for the cyclical changes in the expected excess rates of return on equity,
but their graphs make clear that, even for large ﬁrms, expected excess returns increase by
several percentage points during NBER recessions. Our results are clearly not generated by
unrealistically cyclical changes in the required rate of return.
Kim, Palia, and Saunders (2005) report an average underwriting spread of 7.6 per cent
for initial public equity oﬀerings (IPOs), and 5.1 per cent for seasoned public equity oﬀer-
ings (SEOs). Using the diﬀerence between the closing and the oﬀer price to construct an
estimate of indirect costs, Kim, Palia, and Saunders (2005) report an average of 31.2 per
cent for IPOs and 2.6 per cent for SEOs. They also report a wide range of diﬀerent values.
When the lowest and highest 5 per cent are ignored, then the indirect cost varies from -6 per
cent to 156 per cent for IPOs, and from -4.7 per cent to 13.1 per cent for SEOs. Similarly,
Loughran and Ritter (2002) report that $9.1 million “is left on the table” for the average
IPO, which corresponds to three years of operating proﬁts.
The average equity issuance cost in our model is equal to 4.4 per cent of equity raised,
which is reasonable given the estimates found in the literature. The standard deviation of
26average equity issuance cost is equal to 3.6 per cent. Unfortunately, there is no empirical
evidence on the magnitude of the cyclical changes in average equity issuance costs. Given
the extent of underpricing, there is clearly room for the magnitude of the cyclical changes
we consider. Moreover, given that the cyclical variation in the required rate of return is still
quite low, one can to some extent lower the cyclical variation in the equity issuance cost and
raise the cyclical variation in the required rate of return. We discuss this further in the next
section.
4.5 Results for the benchmark model
In this section, we investigate whether (i) the model does a good job in replicating the cross-
sectional pattern of cyclical changes for debt and equity ﬁnance documented in our empirical
work, (ii) the model can generate a substantially stronger cyclical response for smaller ﬁrms,
(iii) the model can generate a countercyclical default rate, and (iv) the model with equity
issuance can substantially magnify shocks.
Output and default rates. Figure 5 plots the impulse-response functions for output
and the default rate when aggregate productivity is hit by a positive one-standard-deviation
shock. It also plots the responses in the prototype model. The ﬁgure shows that the model can
generate a countercyclical default rate and that shocks are strongly magniﬁed. In particular,
the ﬁrst-period response of output for small ﬁrms in the benchmark model is 84 per cent
higher than the response in the prototype model. In the latter, the output response is
slightly below the response of the frictionless model. The increase in equity issuance not only
has a direct eﬀect on output by increasing the amount of net worth, it also increases the
amount of debt the ﬁrm can borrow and it reduces the default rate. For aggregate output,
there is also a considerable amount of magniﬁcation; the ﬁrst-period response of output in
the benchmark model is 45 per cent higher than the response in the prototype model.
For small ﬁrms, the average default rate drops by 118 basis points in the ﬁrst period and
continues to drop until it is 162 basis points below the pre-shock value in the third period.
Even at the aggregate level the drop in the default rate is substantial: it drops by 39 basis
points in the ﬁrst period and the maximum reduction is 56 basis points.44
44Levin, Natalucci, and Zakrajsek (2004) estimate the external ﬁnance premium for ﬁrms at the 25th, 50th,
and 75th percentile of the sales-weighted distribution, and ﬁnd noticeable cyclical changes in the external
ﬁnance premium for large ﬁrms as well.
27Debt and equity. The two top panels of Figure 6 plot the responses of equity and debt for
small ﬁrms, large ﬁrms, and the aggregate. The bottom panels of Figure 6 plot the responses
of net worth for the three ﬁrm categories, and plot at the aggregate level retained earnings
and dividends. First, consider the responses for large ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst period, net worth
for large ﬁrms increases. The main reason is that the reduction in the price of risk induces
dividend-paying ﬁrms to reduce dividends, although there also is a small increase in equity
issuance. The increase in retained earnings goes together with an increase in debt ﬁnancing.
Small ﬁrms respond to the positive productivity shock by sharply increasing equity. Debt
also increases in the ﬁrst couple years after the shock, but it increases by less than equity.
After some time, the impulse-response function even turns negative. Even though debt
is monotonically increasing in the aggregate shock, it is—except at low net-worth levels—
decreasing in net worth. During the ﬁrst couple of periods, the direct eﬀect of the increase in
productivity dominates and debt increases. After some time, the shift in the cross-sectional
distribution towards larger ﬁrms implies a (small) reduction in debt levels relative to the pre-
shock levels. The increase in average ﬁrm size following the productivity shock also explains
that, at some point, the response of retained earnings becomes slightly negative and the
response of dividends becomes slightly positive.
Table 9 reports the cross-correlations between equity issuance and GDP, debt issuance
and GDP, and debt and equity issuance for simulated and actual data. The coeﬃcients have
the same sign as their empirical counterpart. That is, both equity and debt issuance are
procyclical. Correlation coeﬃcients implied by the model are, however, higher than their
empirical counterparts. This is not very surprising, since the model has only one aggregate
shock.
Figure 7 shows the counterpart of the observed cyclical equity component plotted in
Figure 1, and the counterpart of the observed cyclical debt component plotted in Figure 2
using long-term debt issuance and in Figure 3 using the change in total liabilities. The top
panel gives a typical simulation of equity issues for the bottom 25 per cent, the bottom 50
per cent, and the bottom 99 per cent of ﬁrms. As in Figure 1, equity issuance displays
much larger cyclical swings for smaller ﬁrms. The bottom panel of Figure 7 plots the cyclical
behaviour of debt issuance for the same size classes. As in the data, the diﬀerences in debt
issuance over the cycle across ﬁrm categories are smaller than for equity. In the simulated
data, however, the cyclical movements for debt issues by small ﬁrms are still larger, whereas
in the data that is observed only in the seventies.
284.6 Alternative parameter values
The role of α. Our benchmark value of α is equal to 0.7, and here we discuss the eﬀects
of lowering α to 0.4. A value of α less than one plays a key role in our analysis. If α is
equal to one—which is a common assumption in the literature on agency problems—then
the increase in net worth (either because of an increase in retained earnings or because of an
increase in equity) would have no eﬀect on the default rate. This does not mean, however,
that the lower the value of α the more countercyclical the default rate, because α also aﬀects
ﬁrm proﬁtability. At lower values of α, ﬁrms quickly reach a level of net worth at which
default rates are small. One can control for this by increasing the ﬁxed cost.
In particular, for our lower value of α, we increase the ﬁxed-cost parameter from 0.0975
to 0.14. All other parameters are kept the same. This version generates similar responses.
For example, the ﬁrst-period output response for small ﬁrms is 47 per cent higher than
the response in the frictionless model, whereas it is 64 per cent higher for the benchmark
parameters.
Lower cyclical variation in equity issuance costs. Cyclical variation in equity issuance
costs and the required rate of return plays an important role in generating procyclical equity
issuance. Our calibration exercise implies a certain amount of cyclical variation in equity
issuance and the required rate of return. As noted earlier, the standard deviation of the
required rate of return is much lower than the numbers reported in Perez-Quiros and Tim-
mermann (2000). We also analyze what happens if the cyclical variation in the required rate
of return is increased by raising the value of γ from 0.138 to 0.3 and the cyclical variation in
equity issuance cost is decreased by lowering the value of λ1 from 125 to 60. This combination
leaves the volatility of equity issuance (of all ﬁrms) unchanged. The standard deviation of
equity issuance cost is now 1.52 per cent instead of 3.6 per cent, and the standard deviation
of the required rate of return is 0.35 percentage points instead of 0.16. For these parame-
ter values, the initial output response for small ﬁrms is 29 per cent above the frictionless
response, so equity issuance still helps to magnify shocks. This magniﬁcation is less than in
the benchmark speciﬁcation, however, where the corresponding number is equal to 64 per
cent. Moreover, by shifting from cyclical variation in equity issuance cost to cyclical variation
in the required rate of return, the output response of small and large ﬁrms becomes more
similar: changes in the required rate of return aﬀect the net worth of small and large ﬁrms,
whereas changes in equity issuance aﬀect ﬁrms that issue equity (i.e., small ﬁrms). If the
price of risk for small ﬁrms is more cyclical than the price of risk for large ﬁrms, then changes
29in the required rate of return would also have a bigger eﬀect on small ﬁrms.45
The numerical experiments described in this paper show that cyclical variation in equity
issuance cost and the price of risk is very eﬀective in explaining the pattern of equity issuance
observed across ﬁrms. More empirical information on the cyclical variation in equity issuance
cost and the price of risk would be helpful in distinguishing between these two factors.
5. Conclusions
Most quantitative studies of the importance of ﬁnancial frictions for aggregate ﬂuctuations
assume that ﬁrms can obtain external ﬁnancing only through the one-period debt contract.
But it is clear that ﬁrms use other forms of ﬁnancing and that, in particular, they rely
on long-term debt and equity. A proper study of the role of ﬁnancial frictions should take
this into account and it is therefore important that theoretical challenges to study the more
complex environment be overcome. In this paper, we allow ﬁrms to also raise external funds
through equity and analyze three reasons for equity to be procyclical: (i) the property of the
one-period debt contract, which makes the shadow price of external funds procyclical, (ii)
a countercyclical price of risk, and (iii) a countercyclical cost of issuing equity. With these
three channels, the model can replicate the empirical ﬁndings of equity ﬁnance for small and
large ﬁrms, generate a countercyclical default rate, and magnify shocks.
Levy and Hennessy (2006) and Jermann and Quadrini (2006) also develop theoretical
models to study the cyclical behaviour of debt and equity over the business cycle. They
identify diﬀerent channels. In particular, in both models the substitution plays an important
role, although the models have opposite implications for which form of external ﬁnance be-
comes more attractive during an expansion. In the numerical example of Levy and Hennessy
(2006), equity is procyclical for all ﬁrms, debt is procyclical for ﬁrms with more stringent
ﬁnancing constraints, and debt is countercyclical for ﬁrms with less stringent ﬁnancing con-
straints. Key in deriving this result is that the constraint on equity ﬁnancing is always binding
for all ﬁrms, but the constraint on debt ﬁnancing is not binding for ﬁrms with less stringent
ﬁnancing constraints; i.e., ﬁrms for which resource and asset diversion is more costly. Con-
sequently, as aggregate conditions weaken, external equity issuance diminishes, but for those
ﬁrms with a slack constraint on debt ﬁnancing, the reduction in external equity ﬁnancing
can be partly replaced by debt ﬁnancing. In our framework, however, the constraint on debt
45Note that Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) do ﬁnd larger cyclical variation in the required rate of
return for small ﬁrms.
30ﬁnancing is always binding46 and the costs associated with raising external equity are present
only initially. That is, after the new shares have been issued there is no longer a diﬀerence
between new and old shareholders.
In contrast, equity issuance is countercyclical in Jermann and Quadrini (2006). They allow
ﬁrms to borrow through one-period debt contracts, but there is no default. Consequently,
they do not have the procyclical shadow price of external funds. Nor do they have the cyclical
changes in equity issuance cost, or cyclical changes in agents’ risk tolerance. Key in their
paper is the constraint that links the amount of debt to the value of the ﬁrm. An aggregate
shock that reduces the value of the ﬁrm has such a large impact on the available amount of
debt ﬁnancing that it induces ﬁrms to issue more equity.
The relevance of diﬀerent channels may very well change over time, and may diﬀer by type
of ﬁrm. Empirical work that could distinguish between the diﬀerent empirical channels would
be of interest. There are several important extensions for the theoretical analysis as well.
Two limitations of this paper are that it does not allow for long-term debt and idiosyncratic
shocks are not persistent. With multi-period debt contracts, there is an additional reason
why equity is procyclical. Equity issuance is a wealth transfer from the equity providers to
the holders of long-term debt, since the additional equity reduces the probability of default.
But this eﬀect is likely to be less important during a boom, since the probability of default
is (or should be) smaller. With persistent idiosyncratic shocks, a much richer cross-sectional
distribution could be generated and, in particular, this would add heterogeneity in the top
half of the distribution.
46Because of the tax advantage of debt, ﬁrms do not build up enough net worth to fully ﬁnance the ﬁrst-best
capital stock with internal funds.
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35Table 1: Summary statistics for diﬀerent size classes
Averages of














[0,25%] 715 0.006 0.410 0.307 0.348 0.637 0.014 0.526 0.287
[0,50%] 1415 0.026 0.448 0.214 0.417 0.471 0.111 0.366 0.471
[0,75%] 2118 0.089 0.498 0.164 0.487 0.328 0.188 0.248 0.631
[0,99%] 2807 0.657 0.579 0.112 0.589 0.165 0.253 0.146 0.705
[90%,95%] 144 0.132 0.586 0.109 0.611 0.129 0.263 0.122 0.717
[95%,99%] 117 0.301 0.603 0.092 0.626 0.104 0.279 0.112 0.695
[99%,100%] 29 0.343 0.601 0.079 0.630 0.091 0.284 0.116 0.531
All ﬁrms 2836 1 0.587 0.101 0.600 0.144 0.261 0.138 0.659
Notes: The data set consists of annual Compustat data from 1971 to 2004. Leverage, L
A,
equals liabilities divided by assets. Asset growth, ∆A
A , equals the change in the book value
of assets from period t−1 to t divided by the current value of assets. Change in liabilities,
∆L, equals the change in the book value of total liabilities. Change in equity, ∆E, equals
the change in stockholders’ equity minus retained earnings. Retained earnings, ∆RE, is
the change in the balance-sheet item for retained earnings. Sale of stock, ∆S, equals sale
of common and preferred stock, and ∆D is issuance of long-term debt. For further details
on the data series used, see Appendix B.
36Table 2: Cyclical behaviour of equity issuance: level approach
Size classes Sale of stock and Change in equity and
GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1
[0,25%] -0.02 0.24 0.29 0.03 0.26 0.26
(-0.05) (1.02) (2.16) (0.07) (1.16) (2.25)
[0,50%] 0.10 0.33 0.31 0.16 0.32 0.23
(0.29) (1.78) (2.32) (0.45) (1.89) (1.79)
[0,75%] 0.18 0.35 0.30 0.21 0.28 0.15
(0.63) (1.91) (1.84) (0.67) (1.81) (1.06)
[0,99%] 0.22 0.36 0.33 0.12 0.12 0.02
(0.71) (1.78) (1.82) (0.36) (0.67) (0.12)
[90%,95%] 0.42 0.45 0.21 0.23 0.10 -0.12
(2.59) (5.45) (1.61) (0.75) (0.62) (-0.79)
[95%,99%] -0.03 0.12 0.28 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09
(-0.07) (0.49) (2.48) (-0.19) (-0.47) (-0.53)
[99%,100%] -0.26 -0.43 -0.44 -0.10 -0.36 -0.42
(-0.93) (-2.54) (-3.94) (-0.26) (-1.53) (-4.14)
All ﬁrms 0.12 0.20 0.16 0.04 -0.07 -0.15
(0.34) (0.83) (0.93) (0.12) (-0.28) (-1.17)
Size classes Sale of stock and Change in equity and
∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1 ∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1
[0,25%] 0.37 0.80 0.73 0.40 0.83 0.73
(4.31) (7.95) (7.67) (3.95) (9.30) (5.52)
[0,50%] 0.37 0.78 0.69 0.45 0.82 0.64
(2.81) (7.28) (4.16) (3.09) (9.73) (2.44)
[0,75%] 0.40 0.76 0.65 0.51 0.78 0.55
(2.59) (7.04) (2.86) (2.82) (9.45) (1.57)
[0,99%] 0.23 0.47 0.45 0.47 0.50 0.23
(0.69) (1.39) (1.89) (1.19) (2.28) (1.32)
[90%,95%] 0.24 0.45 0.40 0.45 0.41 0.10
(1.11) (3.10) (2.88) (1.54) (2.39) (0.59)
[95%,99%] 0.12 0.25 0.20 0.43 0.37 -0.01
(0.43) (0.52) (0.54) (1.24) (1.24) (-0.06)
[99%,100%] 0.69 0.24 -0.23 0.80 0.62 0.05
(6.43) (3.25) (-2.50) (8.76) (4.66) (0.37)
All ﬁrms 0.29 0.39 0.23 0.59 0.51 0.11
(0.82) (1.24) (0.91) (2.36) (2.53) (0.82)
Notes: All series are logged and HP ﬁltered. For further details,
see the text and Appendix B. The standard errors are computed
using the VARHAC procedure in den Haan and Levin (1997),
and t-statistics are in parentheses. The correlation coeﬃcients
statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level
are highlighted in bold.
37Table 3: Cyclical behaviour of equity issuance: ﬂow approach
Size classes Sale of stock and Change in equity and
GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1
[0,25%] -0.11 0.13 0.20 -0.03 0.19 0.20
(-0.42) (0.50) (1.20) (-0.13) (0.75) (1.43)
[0,50%] -0.10 0.15 0.22 0.03 0.23 0.20
(-0.43) (0.63) (1.66) (0.15) (1.17) (2.08)
[0,75%] -0.12 0.13 0.24 0.07 0.22 0.17
(-0.58) (0.56) (1.88) (0.35) (1.18) (2.04)
[0,99%] -0.21 0.05 0.30 0.06 0.15 0.10
(-1.20) (0.22) (1.35) (0.28) (0.63) (0.93)
[90%,95%] -0.07 0.31 0.31 0.18 0.25 0.09
(-0.47) (2.56) (3.18) (1.05) (1.79) (1.90)
[95%,99%] -0.28 -0.29 0.08 0.04 -0.06 -0.14
(-1.81) (-1.10) (0.30) (0.18) (-0.22) (-0.83)
[99%,100%] 0.08 -0.13 -0.23 0.32 -0.08 -0.23
(0.46) (-0.90) (-0.76) (4.07) (-0.51) (-1.83)
All ﬁrms -0.14 -0.00 0.17 0.17 0.07 -0.01
(-0.74) (-0.00) (0.58) (1.03) (0.30) (-0.08)
Size classes Sale of stock and Change in equity and
∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1 ∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1
[0,25%] 0.22 0.91 0.35 0.31 0.91 0.28
(5.96) (13.66) (6.38) (7.96) (14.91) (4.85)
[0,50%] 0.16 0.81 0.28 0.26 0.80 0.15
(1.72) (6.39) (5.04) (3.63) (8.02) (3.04)
[0,75%] 0.07 0.65 0.33 0.21 0.63 0.12
(0.38) (3.90) (3.38) (1.13) (4.69) (1.49)
[0,99%] -0.13 0.15 0.34 0.15 0.23 -0.06
(-0.41) (0.54) (2.81) (0.48) (0.84) (-0.61)
[90%,95%] -0.11 0.35 0.29 0.03 0.28 -0.18
(-0.39) (2.87) (2.76) (0.14) (2.10) (-1.66)
[95%,99%] -0.08 -0.18 0.09 0.31 0.16 -0.28
(-0.93) (-0.71) (0.32) (2.03) (0.51) (-3.63)
[99%,100%] 0.33 -0.03 -0.24 0.36 0.48 -0.39
(1.26) (-0.16) (-1.96) (2.38) (3.06) (-5.30)
All ﬁrms -0.01 0.07 0.08 0.28 0.28 -0.25
(-0.04) (0.21) (0.41) (1.02) (1.15) (-2.69)
Notes: Real GDP is logged and HP ﬁltered. Other series are al-
ready expressed as a rate and are HP ﬁltered only. For further
details, see the text and Appendix B. The standard errors are
computed using the VARHAC procedure in den Haan and Levin
(1997), and t-statistics are in parentheses. The correlation coeﬃ-
cients statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance
level are highlighted in bold.
38Table 4: Cyclical behaviour of debt issuance: level approach
Size classes LT debt issues and Change in liabilities and
GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1
[0,25%] 0.27 0.30 0.11 0.49 0.44 0.10
(3.01) (3.94) (0.87) (4.86) (3.53) (0.57)
[0,50%] 0.29 0.30 0.08 0.62 0.49 0.04
(3.45) (4.12) (0.63) (8.06) (3.77) (0.18)
[0,75%] 0.38 0.35 0.08 0.69 0.52 -0.00
(5.08) (4.03) (0.65) (9.28) (3.60) (-0.01)
[0,99%] 0.50 0.31 0.06 0.84 0.43 -0.15
(3.84) (2.07) (0.50) (21.86) (3.04) (-0.81)
[90%,95%] 0.51 0.36 0.13 0.81 0.50 -0.04
(3.38) (2.16) (1.30) (20.53) (4.53) (-0.27)
[95%,99%] 0.47 0.19 0.02 0.78 0.26 -0.24
(2.34) (1.28) (0.17) (12.48) (1.65) (-2.35)
[99%,100%] -0.05 -0.13 -0.26 0.35 -0.05 -0.52
(-0.23) (-0.82) (-1.91) (3.60) (-0.44) (-5.97)
All ﬁrms 0.41 0.23 -0.02 0.71 0.26 -0.33
(3.36) (1.77) (-0.14) (10.52) (2.11) (-2.43)
Size classes LT debt issues and Change in liabilities and
∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1 ∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1
[0,25%] 0.44 0.77 0.57 0.64 0.90 0.63
(3.82) (7.68) (7.61) (7.06) (21.44) (13.30)
[0,50%] 0.40 0.71 0.58 0.67 0.92 0.67
(3.81) (6.40) (7.71) (6.86) (33.65) (13.28)
[0,75%] 0.42 0.69 0.58 0.69 0.94 0.68
(5.14) (8.67) (11.70) (8.33) (67.39) (9.25)
[0,99%] 0.47 0.60 0.54 0.68 0.93 0.65
(5.06) (7.74) (5.25) (9.77) (61.14) (9.28)
[90%,95%] 0.54 0.67 0.57 0.70 0.94 0.69
(4.99) (7.68) (6.49) (8.64) (59.81) (12.98)
[95%,99%] 0.40 0.49 0.45 0.59 0.90 0.61
(2.56) (4.31) (3.69) (8.93) (38.83) (4.19)
[99%,100%] 0.29 0.26 0.11 0.70 0.94 0.62
(2.93) (2.02) (0.49) (11.18) (78.84) (10.04)
All ﬁrms 0.35 0.55 0.54 0.68 0.93 0.67
(4.06) (8.93) (7.47) (12.12) (65.71) (10.14)
Notes: All series are logged and HP ﬁltered. For further details,
see the text and Appendix B. The standard errors are computed
using the VARHAC procedure in den Haan and Levin (1997),
and t-statistics are in parentheses. The correlation coeﬃcients
statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level
are highlighted in bold.
39Table 5: Cyclical behaviour of debt issuance: ﬂow approach
Size classes LT debt issues and Change in liabilities and
GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1
[0,25%] 0.10 0.45 0.29 0.19 0.56 0.27
(0.48) (6.57) (1.16) (1.13) (6.54) (0.96)
[0,50%] 0.17 0.53 0.30 0.21 0.62 0.24
(1.11) (4.74) (2.40) (2.13) (12.09) (1.80)
[0,75%] 0.24 0.59 0.40 0.25 0.69 0.27
(1.59) (6.62) (2.90) (3.56) (18.31) (1.98)
[0,99%] 0.52 0.44 0.36 0.54 0.74 0.24
(5.75) (1.91) (1.09) (7.21) (11.53) (0.88)
[90%,95%] 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.44 0.74 0.35
(5.21) (1.78) (1.24) (5.09) (29.00) (1.20)
[95%,99%] 0.47 0.20 0.21 0.66 0.61 0.11
(3.81) (0.59) (0.81) (9.53) (4.14) (0.34)
[99%,100%] 0.18 0.02 -0.13 0.57 0.56 0.02
(1.15) (0.12) (-1.58) (10.70) (9.40) (0.10)
All ﬁrms 0.52 0.40 0.29 0.60 0.73 0.16
(6.05) (1.97) (1.01) (12.29) (10.60) (0.67)
Size classes LT debt issues and Change in liabilities and
∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1 ∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1
[0,25%] 0.23 0.41 0.26 0.26 0.63 0.31
(1.93) (2.70) (1.62) (2.59) (13.29) (1.89)
[0,50%] 0.34 0.53 0.25 0.29 0.76 0.24
(4.83) (2.92) (3.03) (3.34) (11.16) (1.95)
[0,75%] 0.33 0.65 0.33 0.32 0.88 0.25
(4.81) (5.93) (3.94) (4.21) (20.44) (2.04)
[0,99%] 0.59 0.39 0.26 0.39 0.94 0.34
(7.99) (3.57) (1.29) (5.94) (33.45) (2.37)
[90%,95%] 0.60 0.39 0.19 0.35 0.94 0.32
(6.57) (2.55) (1.13) (3.81) (36.70) (2.07)
[95%,99%] 0.56 0.24 0.05 0.43 0.90 0.38
(4.92) (1.95) (0.30) (13.90) (31.19) (3.18)
[99%,100%] 0.30 0.05 -0.06 0.15 0.94 0.18
(2.31) (0.70) (-0.48) (1.57) (91.58) (1.71)
All ﬁrms 0.52 0.35 0.28 0.31 0.94 0.32
(8.93) (3.10) (1.53) (4.29) (34.89) (2.02)
Notes: Real GDP is logged and HP ﬁltered. Other series are al-
ready expressed as a rate and are HP ﬁltered only. For further
details, see the text and Appendix B. The standard errors are
computed using the VARHAC procedure in den Haan and Levin
(1997), and t-statistics are in parentheses. The correlation coeﬃ-
cients statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































41Table 7: Cyclical behaviour of retained earnings, proﬁts, and dividends: ﬂow approach
Size classes Retained earnings and Proﬁts and Dividends and
GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1
[0,25%] -0.15 -0.17 -0.25 -0.11 -0.17 -0.31 0.59 0.47 -0.11
(-1.02) (-0.59) (-2.17) (-0.60) (-0.62) (-3.06) (5.95) (3.58) (-0.56)
[0,50%] -0.18 0.03 -0.02 -0.17 0.01 -0.08 0.31 -0.03 -0.21
(-0.73) (0.10) (-0.17) (-0.61) (0.03) (-0.94) (3.51) (-0.10) (-1.49)
[0,75%] -0.16 0.18 0.08 -0.15 0.24 0.13 0.36 0.28 0.05
(-0.69) (0.69) (1.29) (-0.55) (0.91) (2.85) (3.10) (1.26) (0.30)
[0,99%] 0.09 0.46 0.17 0.08 0.58 0.27 0.13 0.28 0.38
(0.41) (3.41) (2.18) (0.39) (4.91) (2.84) (2.01) (3.27) (7.01)
[90%,95%] 0.03 0.39 0.12 0.10 0.55 0.29 0.17 0.22 0.29
(0.11) (2.05) (1.45) (0.42) (4.03) (3.53) (3.88) (3.81) (5.33)
[95%,99%] 0.16 0.48 0.18 0.10 0.60 0.27 -0.10 0.19 0.45
(1.23) (7.61) (2.33) (0.90) (6.26) (2.63) (-1.18) (2.10) (5.24)
[99%,100%] 0.33 0.38 0.10 0.17 0.39 0.07 0.09 0.19 0.23
(1.05) (4.79) (0.38) (0.88) (4.01) (0.36) (0.52) (1.39) (1.10)
All ﬁrms 0.22 0.46 0.14 0.12 0.53 0.20 0.14 0.30 0.39
(0.80) (4.04) (1.19) (0.59) (5.12) (1.73) (1.23) (3.03) (5.62)
Size classes Retained earnings and Proﬁts and Dividends and
∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1 ∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1 ∆At−1 ∆At ∆At+1
[0,25%] -0.30 -0.60 -0.26 -0.26 -0.57 -0.30 0.04 0.05 -0.23
(-1.03) (-2.22) (-5.49) (-0.75) (-1.92) (-6.15) (0.29) (0.19) (-3.60)
[0,50%] -0.37 -0.20 0.12 -0.34 -0.17 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.13
(-1.68) (-0.66) (1.20) (-1.19) (-0.58) (1.31) (0.55) (0.26) (3.12)
[0,75%] -0.22 0.10 0.26 -0.24 0.21 0.34 0.01 0.12 0.16
(-1.18) (0.29) (1.86) (-0.93) (0.62) (2.69) (0.08) (0.44) (0.72)
[0,99%] 0.02 0.71 0.37 -0.02 0.77 0.48 -0.00 0.19 0.39
(0.12) (13.94) (7.98) (-0.13) (10.35) (9.90) (-0.01) (2.36) (4.96)
[90%,95%] -0.00 0.60 0.24 0.03 0.71 0.44 0.15 0.17 0.34
(-0.01) (4.65) (4.91) (0.21) (8.68) (12.58) (1.47) (2.19) (7.96)
[95%,99%] 0.09 0.77 0.53 -0.01 0.77 0.59 -0.14 0.09 0.41
(0.58) (30.97) (11.14) (-0.05) (15.72) (8.02) (-2.04) (0.89) (5.27)
[99%,100%] -0.00 0.71 0.39 0.03 0.65 0.29 -0.02 0.21 0.34
(-0.04) (10.73) (5.58) (0.33) (5.74) (5.46) (-0.07) (1.62) (4.11)
All ﬁrms 0.06 0.75 0.43 -0.02 0.77 0.47 -0.12 0.20 0.48
(0.32) (13.04) (6.61) (-0.16) (9.63) (11.73) (-0.62) (2.17) (9.86)
Notes: Real GDP is logged and HP ﬁltered. Other series are already expressed as a rate and
are HP ﬁltered only. For further details, see the text and Appendix B. The standard errors
are computed using the VARHAC procedure in den Haan and Levin (1997), and t-statistics
are in parentheses. The correlation coeﬃcients statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5 per cent
signiﬁcance level are highlighted in bold.
42Table 8: Calibration
Parameter Source
β 1.022−1 Zhang (2005)
α 0.70 Cooper and Ejarque (2003)
τ 0.296 Graham (2000)
ρ 0.954 Cooley and Hansen (1995)
Parameter Moment Data Model
σ 0.0074 Volatility of asset growth 0.039 0.037
σω 0.31 Default premium 119bp 105bp
δ0 0.082 Investment to assets 0.133 0.134
δ1 -2.72 Leverage 0.587 0.532
η 0.0975 Fraction of dividend payers 0.469 0.429
µ 0.15 Default rate 0.022 0.020
λ0 0.30 Change in equity to assets 0.015 0.011
λ1 125 Volatility of change in equity 0.254 0.221
γ 0.138 Volatility of retained earnings 0.342 0.397
Notes on the model: The parameter β is the discount factor, α the curvature
of technology, τ the tax rate, and ρ the persistence of the aggregate shock.
The parameter σ is the standard deviation of the aggregate shock, σω the
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock, δ0 the depreciation rate, and
δ1 the stochastic depreciation parameter. The parameter η is the ﬁxed cost,
µ the bankruptcy cost, and λ0 the equity issuance cost. Finally, λ1 controls
the time-varying cost of equity and γ the variability of the ﬁrm’s discount
factor. The moments in the model are obtained by simulating an economy
with 5,000 ﬁrms for 5,000 periods and discarding the ﬁrst 500 observations.
Notes on the data: Asset growth is the growth rate of the book value of
assets. The default premium is the estimated default spread on corporate
bonds taken from Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005). Investment includes
capital expenditures, advertising, research and development, and acquisitions.
Leverage equals liabilities divided by the book value of assets. Dividends is
dividends per share by ex-date multiplied by the number of common shares
outstanding. Change in equity equals the change in stockholders’ equity minus
retained earnings. The default rate is the average of annual default rates for all
corporate bonds. Finally, retained earnings is the change in the balance-sheet
item for (accumulated) retained earnings. The volatilities of asset growth,
change in equity, and change in liabilities are from the ﬂow approach. The
latter are expressed as a fraction of the volatility of asset growth. The sample
period is from 1971 until 2004, except for the default rate series, which is from
the period between 1986 and 2004. For further details on the data series used,
see Appendix B.
43Table 9: Cyclical behaviour of debt and equity in the model
Size classes Data Model
Equity issues and GDP
GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1
Bottom tercile -0.04 0.19 0.19 0.12 0.79 0.43
Top tercile 0.19 0.001 -0.10 -0.03 0.28 0.15
All ﬁrms 0.17 0.07 -0.01 0.09 0.75 0.41
Debt issues and GDP
GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1 GDPt−1 GDPt GDPt+1
Bottom tercile 0.20 0.61 0.24 -0.10 0.69 0.48
Top tercile 0.60 0.70 0.12 0.04 0.23 0.15
All ﬁrms 0.60 0.73 0.16 -0.09 0.66 0.45
Debt and Equity issues
Et−1 Et Et+1 Et−1 Et Et+1
Bottom tercile 0.10 0.21 0.14 -0.02 0.65 0.40
Top tercile 0.24 0.04 -0.27 -0.15 -0.07 0.15
All ﬁrms 0.20 0.07 -0.18 -0.04 0.55 -0.38
Notes: For the data, the series selected are change in equity and change in
liabilities following the ﬂow approach. For the model, we examine the average
of equity, et, and debt, (kt − nt), for the three diﬀerent size classes.






























































































1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Bottom 25% Bottom 50%
Bottom 99% Real GDP
Notes: All series are logged and HP ﬁltered. The shaded areas are NBER dates for
recessions. For further details, see the text and Appendix B.
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Notes: All series are logged and HP ﬁltered. The shaded areas are NBER dates for
recessions. For further details, see the text and Appendix B.
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Bottom 25% Bottom 50%
Bottom 99% Real GDP
Notes: All series are logged and HP ﬁltered. The shaded areas are NBER dates for
recessions. For further details, see the text and Appendix B.
47Figure 4: Responses of output and the default rate to positive shock in prototype model
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Default rate of small firms






























Default rate of large firms
Notes: Small ﬁrms are simulated ﬁrms at the bottom tercile in terms of the book value of
assets. Similarly, large ﬁrms are at the top tercile of assets.
48Figure 5: Responses of output and the default rate to a positive shock
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Default rate of large firms
Notes: Small ﬁrms are simulated ﬁrms at the bottom tercile in terms of the book value of
assets. Similarly, large ﬁrms are at the top tercile of assets.
49Figure 6: Responses of debt, equity, net worth, retained earnings, and dividends to a positive
shock




























































































































Aggregate retained earnings and dividends
RE
Dividends
Notes: Small ﬁrms are simulated ﬁrms at the bottom tercile in terms of the book value of
assets. Similarly, large ﬁrms are at the top tercile of assets.
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51Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions
Preliminaries. Before we give the proofs of the propositions, we give the formulas for
the derivatives and present a lemma.
The ﬁrst and second derivatives of F(ω) are given by
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The signs of the two derivatives of G(ω) are not pinned down. For example, there are two
opposing eﬀects of an increase of ω on G(ω). First, an increase in ω reduces F 0(ω); i.e., the
share that goes to the borrower. This corresponds to an increase in lending rates and, thus,
an increase in revenues from ﬁrms that do not default. Second, an increase in ω implies
an increase in bankruptcy costs. For internal optimal values for ω, however, we know that
G0 (ω) ≥ 0. If not, then the bank could increase its own and ﬁrm proﬁts by reducing ω. We
summarize this result in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For internal optimal values of ω, G0(ω) ≥ 0.
The following lemma documents a straightforward implication of Assumption A.





To make the algebra less tedious, we set without loss of generality δ = 1 and r = 0.
Intuition for proposition 1. Both an increase in k and a reduction in ω lead to
an increase in ﬁrm proﬁts, and both lead to a reduction in bank proﬁts, at least in the
52neighborhood of the optimal values for k and ω.1 To satisfy the bank’s break-even condition,
the ﬁrm, thus, faces a trade-oﬀ between a higher capital stock and a lower default rate.
If α = 1, then the problem is linear and an increase in n simply means that the scale of
the problem increases. Consequently, an increase in n does not aﬀect the default rate, but
simply leads to a proportional increase in k. When α < 1, the decreasing returns imply that
an increase in k is not as attractive anymore, and the ﬁrm will substitute part of the increase
in k for a reduction in ω when n increases.
Next, consider what happens if aggregate productivity increases. For the ﬁrm, the relative
beneﬁt of a higher capital stock versus a lower default rate does not change.2 An increase
in θ means, however, that the break-even condition for the bank becomes steeper; that is,
because the bank’s revenues in case of default increase, capital becomes cheaper relative to
ω. In other words, when aggregate productivity is high, that is a good time for the ﬁrm to
expand, even when it goes together with a higher default rate.3
Proof of proposition 1. The result that dω/dn = 0 when α = 1 follows directly from













F(ω) + G(ω). (A2)
Assumption A, together with Lemma 1, implies that the right-hand side decreases with ω.
Suppose, to the contrary, that dω/dn > 0. Then, equation (A2) implies that an increase
in net worth must lead to a decrease in capital. But an increase in ω and a decrease in k
1At very low levels of k, the marginal product of capital is very high and bank proﬁts may be increasing
in k. Such low levels of k are clearly not optimal, since an increase in k would improve both ﬁrm and bank
proﬁts.
2That is, the iso-proﬁt curve does not depend on aggregate productivity.
3In itself, this may not be an implausible or undesirable outcome, but it would be if it leads to procyclical
default rates, which are counterfactual. With α = 1, that would indeed happen. With α < 1, an increase
in net worth reduces the default rate. Consequently, it is possible that subsequent increases in net worth
through retained earnings (which would occur in the dynamic version of the model) would compensate for
the upward pressure on the default rate caused by the increase in aggregate productivity. In our numerical
experiments, however, we ﬁnd that the direct eﬀect of the increase in aggregate productivity is substantially
stronger.
53reduces expected ﬁrm proﬁts, and this can never be optimal, because the old combination of
ω and k is still feasible when n increases. Similarly, dω/dn = 0 is not optimal; according to
equation (A2), it implies that dk/dn = 0, but the zero-proﬁt condition of the bank makes an
increase in k feasible. Consequently, dω/dn < 0.
We next show that dω/dθ > 0. By combining equations (10) and (11), we obtain the














This equation immediately proves the last part of the proposition that dω/dθ = 0, when
n = 0. Using Lemmas 1 and 2 together, with the result that F 0(ω) ≤ 0, implies that the
left-hand side is decreasing in ω. The right-hand side is decreasing in k. Thus, k has to move
in the same direction as ω. A decrease in ω and k, however, is not consistent with (A2).4
Proof of proposition 2. Let e k be the solution of capital when there are no frictions.





















0 (ω)dω = dk. (A5)

























4An increase in θ and a reduction in k lead to a decrease in the left-hand side, while a reduction in ω











First, suppose that n = 0. The denominator is then equal to the denominator in the expres-
sion for the case without frictions. From proposition 1, we know that dω/dθ = 0 if n = 0.
Consequently, the percentage change in capital in the model with frictions is equal to the
percentage change in the model without frictions. When n > 0, there are two factors that
push in opposite directions. The denominator is now larger than 1 − α, which dampens
the increase in capital relative to the increase in the frictionless model. The increase in ω,
however, implies an increase in G(ω), which makes capital more responsive relative to the
increase in the frictionless model. We will next show that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates. The





















(F + ζG)dX = (1 − XG)ζ
0dω + X(1 − Φ − ζ(1 − Φ − µΦ
0))dω,
(F + ζG)dX = (1 − XG)ζ
0dω + 0. (A12)
Lemma 2 implies that ζ
0 > 0. From (A9) we know that (1 − XG) > 0. Equation (A12)
then implies that dX and dω must have the same sign. From proposition 1, we know that
dω/dθ > 0. Thus, according to equation (A12), dX/dθ > 0. In the model without frictions,
dX/dθ = 0, since without frictions X = αθkα−1 is constant. But dX > 0 implies that
dk/dθ < de k/dθ.
55Proof of proposition 3. Key in proving this proposition is the ﬁrst-order condition
of the equity-issuance problem, equation (19). Since equity issuance costs do not depend
on aggregate productivity, equity issuance decreases (increases) in response to an increase in
aggregate productivity, θ, when ∂w/∂e decreases (increases) with θ. The marginal value of
an extra unit of equity in the ﬁrm, ∂w/∂e, is equal to ζ(ω)(1 + r). From equation (12) we
know that the Lagrange multiplier, ζ, can be expressed as a function of ω alone. Moreover,
the regularity condition in Assumption A guarantees that ζ(ω) is increasing in ω, which
means that the marginal value of an extra unit of equity, ∂w/∂e, is increasing in ω. Since ω
is increasing with aggregate productivity, ∂w/∂e is increasing with aggregate productivity,
which means that equity issuance is increasing. Thus, an increase in θ increases the default
rate, which increases the value of an extra unit of net worth in the ﬁrm, ∂w/∂e, which, in
turn, increases equity issuance.
56Appendix B: Data Sources
Output and deﬂator. Real GDP is deﬁned as real gross domestic product, chained 2000
billions of dollars. The source is the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis. The PPI is the producer price index for industrial commodities. The source is the
U.S. Department of labour, Bureau of labour Statistics. We deﬂate ﬁnancing sources with
PPI because we want to measure the purchasing power of the funds raised for ﬁrms.
Compustat. The Compustat data set consists of annual data from 1971 to 2004. It includes
ﬁrms listed on the three U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq) with a non-foreign
incorporation code. We exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms (SIC codes 6000-6999), utilities (4900-4949),
and ﬁrms involved in major mergers (Compustat footnote code AB) from the whole sample.
We also exclude ﬁrms with a missing value for the book value of assets, and ﬁrm-years that
violate the accounting identity by more than 10 per cent of the book value of assets. Finally,
we eliminate the ﬁrms most aﬀected by the accounting change in 1988, namely GM, GE,
Ford, and Chrysler (for details see Bernanke, Campbell, and Whited 1990). Assets, A, is
the book value of assets (Compustat data item 6). Net change in total liabilities, ∆L, is
the change in Compustat data item 181 between period t and t − 1. Retained earnings,
∆RE, is the change in the balance-sheet item for (accumulated) retained earnings (36).
Change in the book value of equity, ∆E, equals the change in stockholders’ equity (216)
minus retained earnings. Sale of stock, ∆S, equals the sale of common and preferred stock
(108), and ∆D equals issuance of long-term debt (111). Leverage, L/A, equals liabilities
(181) divided by assets. Dividends equals dividends per share by ex-date (26) multiplied by
the number of common shares outstanding (25). Operating income equals operating income
before depreciation (13). Investment equals capital expenditures (30) plus advertising (45)
plus research and development (46) plus acquisitions (129).
Default rate and premium. The annual default rate is from Moody’s (mnemonic USMD-
DAIW in Datastream), and it is for all corporate bonds in the United States. The default
premium is the estimated default spread on corporate bonds taken from Longstaﬀ et al.
(2005).
57Appendix C: Robustness and Extensions
We have written an extensive appendix in which we do the following:
• We report the robustness of our results by using an alternative methodology to con-
struct the cyclical components of our preferred debt and equity series. The alternative
methodology corrects for composition eﬀects in the ﬁrm categories.
• We consider alternative equity and debt variables from the Compustat universe:
namely, net sale of stock, the change in equity as deﬁned by Baker and Wurgler (2002),
net issues of long-term debt, and the change in total debt.
• We discuss the cyclical behaviour of leverage using the Compustat data set.
• We use series from the Federal Reserve Bulletin and the Flow of Funds. The disadvan-
tage of these two series is that they are available only at the aggregate level, but the
advantage is that they are available for a longer time period.
• We discuss in detail empirical studies that analyze the cyclical behaviour of debt and
equity ﬁnance.
• We consider in more detail the time-series behaviour of the debt and equity series of
ﬁrms in the top 1 per cent of the size distribution.
• We document that the default rate is countercyclical.
The extensive appendix can be downloaded from http://www.bankofcanada.ca/
/ec/fcovas/cyclical.pdf.
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